3014
When, elsewhere, we come to examine more closely the preconditions for
becoming conscious, we shall be able to find a solution of some of the difficulties
that arise at this juncture. Here it seems a good plan to look at things from
the angle of consciousness, in contrast to our previous approach, which was
upwards from the Ucs. To consciousness the whole sum of psychical processes presents itself as the
realm of the preconscious. A very great part of this preconscious originates in
the unconscious, has the character of its derivatives and is subjected to a
censorship before it can become conscious. Another part of the Pcs. is capable of becoming conscious without any censorship. Here we come upon a
contradiction of an earlier assumption. In discussing the subject of repression
we were obliged to place the censorship which is decisive for becoming
conscious between the systems Ucs. and Pcs.. Now it becomes probable that there is a censorship between the Pcs. and the Cs. Nevertheless we shall do well not to regard this complication as a
difficulty, but to assume that to every transition from one system to that immediately
above it (that is, every advance to a higher stage of psychical organization)
there corresponds a new censorship. This, it may be remarked, does away with the
assumption of a continuous laying down of new registrations.
The reason for all these difficulties is to be found in the circumstance
that the attribute of being conscious, which is the only characteristic of
psychical processes that is directly presented to us, is in no way suited to serve as
a criterion for the differentiation of systems. Apart from the fact that the
conscious is not always conscious but also at times latent, observation has shown
that much that shares the characteristics of the system Pcs. does not become conscious; and we learn in addition that the act of becoming
conscious is dependent on the attention of the Pcs. being turned in certain directions. Hence consciousness stands in no simple
relation either to the different systems or to repression. The truth is that it
is not only the psychically repressed that remains alien to consciousness, but
also some of the impulses which dominate our ego - something, therefore, that
forms the strongest functional antithesis to the repressed. The more we seek to
win our way to a metapsychological view of mental life, the more we must learn
to emancipate ourselves from the importance of the symptom of ‘being conscious’.