

1. See the lectures of 28 January and 11 February above.
2. "Collective word used to designate a considerable quantity of people inhabiting a certain expanse of territory, contained within certain limits, and obedient to the same government." "Nation" in *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers* (Lucques, 1758), vol. 11, pp. 29-30.
3. E.-J. Sieyès, *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-Etat?* On Sieyès, see the lecture of 10 March below.
4. On Augustin Thierry, see the lecture of 10 March below.
5. On François Guizot, see the lecture of 10 March below.
6. Joachim, comte d'Estaing, *Dissertation sur la noblesse d'extraction*.
7. On Buat-Nançay, see the lecture of 10 March below.
8. On Montlosier, see the lecture of 10 March below.
9. The analysis of Boulainvilliers's historical work undertaken by Foucault in this lecture (and the next) is based upon the texts already mentioned in notes 21-22 to the lecture of 11 February and, more specifically, on *Mémoires de l'histoire du gouvernement de la France, in Etat de la France . . . ; Histoire de l'ancien gouvernement de la France . . . ; Dissertation sur la noblesse française servant de Préface aux Mémoires de la maison de Croi et de Boulainvilliers*, in A. Devyer, *Le Sang épuré . . . ; Mémoires présentés à Mgr le duc d'Orléans . . .*
10. This literature begins with Machiavelli, *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio*, written 1513-1517 (Florence, 1531); continues with Bossuet, *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (Paris, 1681), E. W. Montagu, *Reflections on the Rise and Fall of the Ancient Republics* (London, 1759), and A. Ferguson, *The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic* (London, 1783); and ends with Edward Gibbon, *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 6 vols. (London, 1776-1778).
11. Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence* (Amsterdam, 1734).
12. N. Freret, *De l'origine des Français et de leur établissement dans la Gaule*, in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris, 1796-1799), vol. 5, an VII, p. 202.
13. Cf. F. Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral: eine Streitschrift* (Leipzig, 1887), Erste Abhandlung: "Gut und Böse," "Gut und Schlecht," 11; Zweite Abhandlung: "Schuld," "Schlechtes Gewissen und Verwandtes," 16, 17, 18. See also *Morgenröte: Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurtheile* (Chemnitz, 1881), Zweite Buch 112. (French translations: *Genealogie de la morale. Un écrit polémique* [Paris: Gallimard, 1971] and *Aurore. Pensées sur les préjugés moraux* [Paris: Gallimard, 1970]; English translations by Francis Golffing, *The Genealogy of Morals*, in *The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals* [New York: Doubleday, 1956], and by R. J. Hollingdale, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982]). Cf. the quotation from Boulainvilliers in Devyer, *Le Sang épuré . . .*, p. 508: "they were great lovers of freedom, bold, fickle, unfaithful, avid for gain, restless and impatient: this is how the ancient authors describe them."
14. The reference is to the defeat of the Roman Sygarius and the capture of Soissons in 486.

eight

25 FEBRUARY 1976

*Boulainvilliers and the constitution of a historico-political continuum. - Historicism. - Tragedy and public right. - The central administration of history. - The problematic of the Enlightenment and the genealogy of knowledges. - The four operations of disciplinary knowledge and their effects. - Philosophy and science. - Disciplining knowledges.*

WHEN I TALKED TO you about Boulainvilliers, I was certainly not trying to prove to you that something resembling history began with him, because, after all, there is no reason to say that history began with Boulainvilliers rather than with, for example, the sixteenth-century jurists who collated the monuments of public right, with the *parlementaires* who, throughout the seventeenth century, searched the archives and jurisprudence of the State to discover what the basic laws of the kingdom might be, or with the Benedictines, who had been great collectors of charters even since the late sixteenth century. What was in fact established by Boulainvilliers in the early eighteenth century was—I think—a historico-political field. In what sense? First, in this sense: By taking the nation, or rather nations, as his object, Boulainvilliers was able to dig beneath institutions, events, kings and their power, and to analyze something else, namely those societies, as they were called at the time, that were bound together by interests, customs, and laws. By taking them as his object, he changed two things. On the one hand, he began to write (and I think it was the

first time this had happened) the history of subjects, or in other words, to look at power from the other side. He thus began to give a historical status to something that would, with Michelet in the nineteenth century, become the history of the people or the history of peoples.<sup>1</sup> He discovered a certain form of history that existed on the other side of the power relationship. But he analyzed this new form of history not as though it were an inert substance, but as a force—or forces; power itself was no more than one of those forces—an unusual kind of force, or the strangest of all the forces that were fighting one another within the social body. Power is the power of the little group that exercises it but has no force; and yet, ultimately, this power becomes the strongest force of all, a force that no other force can resist, except violence or rebellion. What Boulainvilliers was discovering was that history should not be the history of power, but the history of a monstrous, or at least strange, couple whose enigmatic nature could not exactly be reduced or understood by any juridical fiction: the couple formed by the primal forces of the people, and the force that had finally been constituted by something that had no force, but that was power.

By displacing the axis, the center of gravity, of his analysis, Boulainvilliers did something important. First, because he defined the principle of what might be called the relational character of power: power is not something that can be possessed, and it is not a form of might; power is never anything more than a relationship that can, and must, be studied only by looking at the interplay between the terms of that relationship. One cannot, therefore, write either the history of kings or the history of peoples; one can write the history of what constitutes those opposing terms, one of which is never infinity, and the other of which is never zero. By writing that history, by defining the relational character of power, and by analyzing it in history, Boulainvilliers was challenging—and this, I think, is the other side of what he was doing—the juridical model of sovereignty which had, until then, been the only way of thinking of the relationship between people and monarch, or between the people and those who govern. Boulainvilliers describes the phenomenon of power not in

juridical terms of sovereignty but in historical terms of domination and the play of relations of force. And he places the object of his historical analysis within that field.

In doing so, in taking as his object a power that was essentially relational and not adequate to the juridical form of sovereignty, and by defining a field of forces in which the power-relationship comes into play, Boulainvilliers is taking as his object the historical knowledge that Machiavelli analyzed, but only in prescriptive strategic terms—or in terms of a strategy seen only through the eyes of power and the Prince.<sup>2</sup> You might object that Machiavelli did not just give the Prince advice—whether it is serious or ironic is a different question—about how to manage and organize power, and that the text of *The Prince* itself is full of historical references. You might say that Machiavelli also wrote the *Discorsi*. But for Machiavelli, history is not the domain in which he analyzes power relations. For Machiavelli, history is simply a source of examples, a sort of collection of jurisprudence or of tactical models for the exercise of power. For Machiavelli, history simply records relations of force and the calculations to which they gave rise.

For Boulainvilliers, on the other hand (and this, I think, is the important point), relations of force and the play of power are the very stuff of history. History exists, events occur, and things that happen can and must be remembered, to the extent that relations of power, relations of force, and a certain play of power operate in relations among men. According to Boulainvilliers, historical narratives and political calculations have exactly the same object. Historical narratives and political calculations may not have the same goal, but there is a definite continuity in what they are talking about, and in what is at stake in both narrative and calculation. In Boulainvilliers, we therefore find—for the first time, I think—a historico-political continuum. One could also say, in a slightly different sense, that Boulainvilliers opens up a historico-political field. Let me explain. As I have already told you—and I think this is of fundamental importance if we are to understand Boulainvilliers's starting point—he was trying to make a critique of the knowledge of the intendants, of the sort of

analysis and the projects for government that the intendants or, more generally, the monarchical government was constantly drawing up for power's benefit. It is true that Boulainvilliers was a radical opponent of this knowledge, but he challenges it by reimplanting it within his own discourse, and by using for his own ends the very analyses that we find in the knowledge of the intendants. His goal was to confiscate it and to use it against the system of the absolute monarchy, which was both the birthplace and the field of application of this administrative knowledge, this knowledge of the intendants, and this economic knowledge.

And basically, when Boulainvilliers analyzes the historical evolution of a whole series of specific relations between, if you like, military organization and taxation, he is simply acclimatizing, or using for his own historical analyses, the very form of relationship, the type of intelligibility and the model of relations that had been defined by administrative knowledge, fiscal knowledge, and the knowledge of the intendants. When, for example, Boulainvilliers explains the relation between the employment of mercenaries and increased taxation, or between the debts of the peasantry and the impossibility of marketing the produce of the land, he is simply raising the issues raised by the intendants and financiers of the reign of Louis XIV, but he is doing so within the historical dimension. You will find exactly the same speculations in the work of people such as, for example, Boisguilbert<sup>3</sup> and Vauban.<sup>4</sup> The relation between rural indebtedness and urban prosperity was another important topic of discussion throughout the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. We find, then, the same mode of intelligibility in both the knowledge of the intendants and Boulainvilliers's historical analyses, but he is the first to make this type of relation function in the domain of historical narrative. In other words, Boulainvilliers makes what had until then been no more than State management's principle of rationality function as a principle for understanding history. That a continuity has been established between historical narrative and the management of the State is, I believe, of vital importance. It is the use of the State's model of managerial rationality as a grid for the speculative understanding of his-

tory that establishes the historico-political continuum. And that continuum now makes it possible to use the same vocabulary and the same grid of intelligibility to speak of history and to analyze the management of the State.

I think, finally, that Boulainvilliers establishes a historico-political continuum to the extent that, when he writes history, he has a specific and definite project: his specific goal is restore to the nobility both a memory it has lost and a knowledge that it has always neglected. What Boulainvilliers is trying to do by giving it back its memory and its knowledge is to give it a new force, to reconstruct the nobility as a force within the forces of the social field. For Boulainvilliers, beginning to speak in the domain of history, recounting a history, is therefore not simply a matter of describing a relationship of force, or of reutilizing on behalf of, for example, the nobility a calculation of intelligibility that had previously belonged to the government. He is doing so in order to modify the very disposition and the current equilibrium of the relations of force. History does not simply analyze or interpret forces: it modifies them. The very fact of having control over, or the fact of being right in the order of historical knowledge, in short, of telling the truth about history, therefore enables him to occupy a decisive strategic position.

To sum all this up, we can say that the constitution of a historico-political field is an expression of the fact that we have gone from a history whose function was to establish right by recounting the exploits of heroes or kings, their battles and their wars and so on, that we have gone from a history that established right by telling the story of wars to a history that continues the war by deciphering the war and the struggle that are going on within all the institutions of right and peace. History thus becomes a knowledge of struggles that is deployed and that functions within a field of struggles; there is now a link between the political fight and historical knowledge. And while it is no doubt true that confrontations have always been accompanied by recollections, memories, and various rituals of memorialization, I think that from the eighteenth century onward—and it is at this point that political life and political knowledge begin to be inscribed in

society's real struggles—strategy, or the element of calculation inherent in such struggles, will be articulated with a historical knowledge that takes the form of the interpretation and analysis of forces. We cannot understand the emergence of this specifically modern dimension of politics unless we understand how, from the eighteenth century onward, historical knowledge becomes an element of the struggle: it is both a description of struggles and a weapon in the struggle. History gave us the idea that we are at war; and we wage war through history.

Having established that, let me make two points before we go back to the war that is waged throughout the history of peoples. My first point concerns historicism. Everyone knows of course that historicism is the most dreadful thing in the world. Any philosophy worthy of the name, any theory of society, any self-respecting epistemology that has any claim to distinction obviously has to struggle against the platitudes of historicism. No one would dare to admit to being a historicist. And it can, I think, easily be demonstrated that ever since the nineteenth century, all the great philosophies have, in one way or another, been antihistoricist. One could also, I think, demonstrate that all the human sciences survive, or perhaps even exist, only because they are antihistoricist.<sup>5</sup> One could also demonstrate that when history, or the historical discipline, has recourse to either a philosophy of history or a juridical and moral ideality, or to the human sciences (all of which it finds so enchanting), it is trying to escape its fatal and secret penchant for historicism.

But what is this historicism that everyone—philosophy, the human sciences, history—is so suspicious of? What is this historicism that has to be warded off at all cost, and that philosophical, scientific, and even political modernity have always tried to ward off? Well, I think that historicism is nothing other than what I have just been talking about: the link, the unavoidable connection, between war and history, and conversely, between history and war. No matter how far back it goes, historical knowledge never finds nature, right, order, or peace. However far back it goes, historical knowledge discovers only an unending war, or in other words, forces that relate to one another

and come into conflict with one another, and the events in which relations of force are decided, but always in a provisional way. History encounters nothing but war, but history can never really look down on this war from on high; history cannot get away from war, or discover its basic laws or impose limits on it, quite simply because war itself supports this knowledge, runs through this knowledge, and determines this knowledge. Knowledge is never anything more than a weapon in a war, or a tactical deployment within that war. War is waged throughout history, and through the history that tells the history of war. And history, for its part, can never do anything more than interpret the war it is waging or that is being waged through it.

Well, then, I think it is this essential connection between historical knowledge and the practice of war—it is this, generally speaking, that constitutes the core of historicism, a core that both is irreducible and always has to be sanitized, because of an idea, which has been in circulation for the last one thousand or two thousand years, and which might be described as "platonic" (though we should always be wary of blaming poor old Plato for everything we want to banish). It is an idea that is probably bound up with the whole Western organization of knowledge, namely, the idea that knowledge and truth cannot not belong to the register of order and peace, that knowledge and truth can never be found on the side of violence, disorder, and war. I think that the important thing (and whether it is or is not platonic is of no importance) about this idea that knowledge and truth cannot belong to war, and can only belong to order and peace, is that the modern State has now reimplemented it in what we might call the eighteenth century's "disciplinization" of knowledges. And it is this idea that makes historicism unacceptable to us, that means that we cannot accept something like an indissociable circularity between historical knowledge and the wars that it talks about and which at the same time go on in it. So this is the problem, and this, if you like, is our first task: We must try to be historicists, or in other words, try to analyze this perpetual and unavoidable relationship between the war that is recounted by history and the history that is traversed by the

war it is recounting. And it is along these lines that I will now try to go on with the little story of the Gauls and the Franks that I started to tell.

So much for my first remark, for my first excursus on historicism. To move on to the second: an objection can be made. There might be another way of approaching the theme I touched upon a moment ago, or in other words the disciplinarization of knowledges in the eighteenth century. If we make history, the history of the wars that go on throughout history, the great discursive apparatus that makes possible the eighteenth-century critique of the State, and if we make the history/war relationship the precondition for the emergence of "politics" [ . . . ] the function of order was to reestablish a continuity in its discourse.\*

[At the time when the jurists were exploring the archives in an attempt to discover the basic laws of the kingdom, a historians' history was taking shape, and it was not power's ode to itself. It should not be forgotten that in the seventeenth century, and not only in France, tragedy was one of the great ritual forms in which public right was displayed and in which its problems were discussed. Well, Shakespeare's "historical" tragedies are tragedies about right and the king, and they are essentially centered on the problem of the usurper and dethronement, of the murder of kings and the birth of the new being who is constituted by the coronation of a king. How can an individual use violence, intrigue, murder, and war to acquire a public might that can bring about the reign of peace, justice, order, and happiness? How can illegitimacy produce law? At a time when the theory and history of right are trying to weave the unbroken continuity of public might, Shakespearean tragedy, in contrast, dwells]° on the wound, on the repeated injury that is inflicted on the body of the kingdom when kings die violent deaths and when illegitimate sovereigns come to the throne. I think that Shakespearean tragedy is, at least in terms of one of its axes, a sort of ceremony, a sort of rememorialization of the

\*It is difficult to establish the meaning on the basis of the tape recording. The first eighteen pages of the manuscript were in fact moved to the end in the lecture itself.

problems of public right. The same could be said of French tragedy, of that of Corneille and, of course, especially Racine. Besides, in general terms, isn't Greek tragedy too always, essentially, a tragedy about right? I think that there is a fundamental, essential kinship between tragedy and right, between tragedy and public right, just as there is probably an essential kinship between the novel and the problem of the norm. Tragedy and right, the novel and the norm: perhaps we should look into all this.

Be that as it may, tragedy is a sort of representation of public right, a politico-juridical representation of public might, in seventeenth-century France too. There is, however, one difference—and this (genius aside) is where it basically differs from Shakespeare. On the one hand, French classical tragedy usually deals only with ancient kings. This coding is no doubt a matter of political prudence. But after all, it should not be forgotten that one of the reasons for this reference to antiquity is this: In seventeenth-century France, and especially under Louis XIV, monarchic right was, because of its form and even the continuity of its history, depicted as being directly descended from the monarchies of antiquity. We find the same type of power and the same type of monarchy in Augustus and Nero, or even Pyrrhus,<sup>7</sup> that we find with Louis XIV. It is the same monarchy in both substantive and juridical terms. On the other hand, French classical tragedy contains a reference to antiquity, but we can also see the presence of an institution that appears to restrict in some way the tragic powers of tragedy, and to make it tip over into a theater of gallantry and intrigue: the presence of the court. Ancient tragedy, and courtly tragedy. But what is the court, if not—and this is dazzlingly obvious in the case of Louis XIV—yet another lesson in public right? The court's essential function is to constitute, to organize, a space for the daily and permanent display of royal power in all its splendor. The court is basically a kind of permanent ritual operation that begins again every day and requalifies a man who gets up, goes for a walk, eats, has his loves and his passions, and who is at the same time—thanks to all that, because of all that, and because none of all that is eliminated—a sovereign. The specific operation of court ritual and court

ceremonial is to make his love affairs sovereign, to make his food sovereign, to make his levee and his going-to-bed ritual sovereign. And while the court constantly requalifies his daily routine as sovereign in the person of a monarch who is the very substance of monarchy, tragedy does the same thing in reverse; tragedy undoes and, if you like, recomposes what court ritual establishes each day.

What is the point of classical tragedy, of Racinian tragedy? Its function—or at least one of its axes—is to constitute the underside of the ceremony, to show the ceremony in shreds, the moment when the sovereign, the possessor of public might, is gradually broken down into a man of passion, a man of anger, a man of vengeance, a man of love, incest, and so on. In tragedy, the problem is whether or not starting from this decomposition of the sovereign into a man of passion, the sovereign-king can be reborn and recomposed: the death and resurrection of the body of the king in the heart of the monarch. That is the problem (and it is much more juridical than psychological) that is posed by Racinian tragedy. In that sense, you can well understand that when Louis XIV asked Racine to be his historiographer, he was simply being true to the tradition of what the historiography of the monarchy had been until then, or in other words, an ode to power itself. But he is also allowing Racine to go on performing the function he had played when he wrote his tragedies. He was basically asking him to write, as a historiographer, the fifth act of a happy tragedy, or in other words, to trace the rise of the private man—the courtier who had a heart—to the point where he becomes at once warlord, monarch, and the holder of sovereignty. Entrusting his historiography to a tragic poet did not disturb the order of right, nor did it betray history's old function of establishing right, of establishing the right of the sovereign State. It marked—thanks to a necessity that is bound up with the absolutism of the king—a return to the purest and most elementary function of royal historiography in an absolute monarchy. It must not be forgotten that as a result of a sort of strange lapse into archaism, the absolute monarchy made the ceremony of power an intense political moment, or that the court, which was one of power's ceremonies, was a daily lesson in public right, a daily

demonstration of public right. We can now understand why Racine's appointment allowed the history of the king to take on its purest form and, in a sense, its magico-poetic form. The history of the king could not but become power's ode to itself. So absolutism, court ceremonial, manifestations of public right, classical tragedy, and the historiography of the king: I think they are all part of the same thing.

Excuse my speculations about Racine and historiography. Let's skip a century (the very century that began with Boulainvilliers) and take the example of the last of the absolute monarchs and the last of his historiographers: Louis XVI and Jacob-Nicolas Moreau, the distant successor to Racine, of whom I have already said a few words, as he was the minister of history appointed by Louis XVI toward the end of the 1780s. Who was Moreau, compared to Racine? This is a dangerous parallel, but you might be surprised who comes off worse. Moreau is the scholarly defender of a king who, obviously, needed to be defended on a number of occasions during his lifetime. Moreau certainly played the role of defender when he was appointed in the 1780s—at the very time when the rights of the monarchy were being attacked in the name of history, and from very different directions—not only by the nobility, but also by the *parlementaires* as well as the bourgeoisie. This was the precise moment when history became the discourse that every "nation"—in quotation marks—or at least every order or every class used to lay claim to its right; this is the moment when, if you like, history became the general discourse of political struggles. It was at this point, then, that a ministry of history was created. And at this point, you will ask me: Did history really escape the State, given that, a hundred years after Racine, we see the emergence of a historiographer who had at least equally close links with power of the State because he actually did, as I have just said, have a ministerial or at least administrative function?

So what was the point of creating this central ministry to administer history? Its purpose was to arm the king for the political battle insofar as he was, after all, no more than one force among others, and was being attacked by other forces. Its purpose was also to attempt to impose a sort of enforced peace on those historico-political struggles.

Its purpose was to code this discourse on history once and for all, and in such a way that it could be integrated into the practice of the State. Hence the tasks with which Moreau was entrusted: collating the administration's documents, making them available to the administration itself (beginning with the financial administrators and then the others), and, finally, opening up these documents, this storehouse of documents, to the people who were being paid by the king to carry out this research.<sup>8</sup> Quite apart from the fact that Moreau is not Racine, that Louis XVI is not Louis XIV, and that all this is far removed from the ceremonial description of the crossing of the Rhine, what is the difference between Moreau and Racine, between the old historiography (which was, in a sense, at its purest in the late seventeenth century) and the kind of history the State begins to take in hand and bring under its control in the late eighteenth century? Can we say that history ceases to be the State's discourse about itself, once we have, perhaps, left court historiography? Can we say that we are now involved with an administrative-type historiography? I think that there is a considerable difference between the two things, or in any case that it has to be measured.

So, another new excursus, if you will allow me. The difference between what might be called the history of the sciences and the genealogy of knowledges is that the history of sciences is essentially located on an axis that is, roughly speaking, the cognition-truth axis, or at least the axis that goes from the structure of cognition to the demand for truth. Unlike the history of the sciences, the genealogy of knowledges is located on a different axis, namely the discourse-power axis or, if you like, the discursive practice-clash of power axis. Now it seems to me that if we apply it to what is for a whole host of reasons the privileged period of the eighteenth century, to this domain or this region, the genealogy of knowledge must first—before it does anything else—outwit the problematic of the Enlightenment. It has to outwit what was at the time described (and was still described in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) as the progress of enlightenment, the struggle of knowledge against ignorance, of reason against chimeras, of experience against prejudices, of reason against error, and

so on. All this has been described as, or symbolized by, light gradually dispelling darkness, and it is this, I think, that we have to get rid of [on the contrary,] when we look at the eighteenth century—we have to see, not this relationship between day and night, knowledge and ignorance, but something very different: an immense and multiple battle, but not one between knowledge and ignorance, but an immense and multiple battle between knowledges in the plural—knowledges that are in conflict because of their very morphology, because they are in the possession of enemies, and because they have intrinsic power-effects.

I will take one or two examples that will, for a moment, take us away from history. Take the problem of technical or technological knowledge. It is often said that the eighteenth century was the century that saw the emergence of technical knowledges. What actually happened in the eighteenth century was quite different. First of all, we have the plural, polymorphous, multiple, and dispersed existence of different knowledges, which existed with their differences—differences defined by geographical regions, by the size of the workshops or factories, and so on. The differences among them—I am speaking of technological expertise, remember—were defined by local categories, education, and the wealth of their possessors. And these knowledges were struggling against one another, with one another, in a society where knowing the secret behind technological knowledge was a source of wealth, and in which the mutual independence of these knowledges also made individuals independent. So multiple knowledge, knowledge-as-secret, knowledge functioning as wealth and as a guarantee of independence: technological knowledge functioned within this patchwork. Now, as both the productive forces and economic demand developed, the price of these knowledges rose, and the struggle between them, the need to delineate their independence and the need for secrecy intensified and became, so to speak, more tense. At the same time, we saw the development of processes that allowed bigger, more general, or more industrialized knowledges, or knowledges that circulated more easily, to annex, confiscate, and take over smaller, more particular, more local, and more artisanal knowledges.

There was a sort of immense economico-political struggle around or over these knowledges, their dispersal, or their heterogeneity, an immense struggle over the economic inductions and power-effects that were bound up with the exclusive ownership of a knowledge, its dispersal and its secret. What has been called the development of technological knowledge in the eighteenth century has to be thought of in terms of a form of multiplicity, and not in terms of the triumph of light over darkness or of knowledge over ignorance.

Now, the State will intervene, either directly or indirectly, in these attempts at annexation, which are also attempts at generalization, in four main ways. First, by eliminating or disqualifying what might be termed useless and irreducible little knowledges that are expensive in economic terms: elimination and disqualification, then. Second, by normalizing these knowledges; this makes it possible to fit them together, to make them communicate with one another, to break down the barriers of secrecy and technological and geographical boundaries. In short, this makes not only knowledges, but also those who possess them, interchangeable. The normalization of dispersed knowledges. Third operation: the hierarchical classification of knowledges allows them to become, so to speak, interlocking, starting with the most particular and material knowledges, which are also subordinated knowledges, and ending with the most general forms, with the most formal knowledges, which are also the forms that envelop and direct knowledge. So, a hierarchical classification. And finally, once all this has been done, a fourth operation becomes possible: a pyramidal centralization that allows these knowledges to be controlled, which ensures that they can be selected, and both that the content of these knowledges can be transmitted upward from the bottom, and that the overall directions and the general organizations it wishes to promote can be transmitted downward from the top.

The tendency to organize technological knowledges brings with it a whole series of practices, projects, and institutions. The *Encyclopédie*, for example. The *Encyclopédie* is usually seen only in terms of its political or ideological opposition to the monarchy and at least one form of Catholicism. Its interest in technology is not in fact a reflection of

some philosophical materialism; it is actually an attempt to homogenize technological knowledges, and it is at once political and economic. The great studies of handicraft methods, metallurgical techniques, and mining—the great surveys that were made between the middle and the end of the eighteenth century—corresponded to this attempt to normalize technical knowledges. The existence, foundation, or development of *grandes écoles* such as the *École des Mines* and the *École Ponts et Chaussées*, and so on, made it possible to establish both quantitative and qualitative levels, breaks and strata between these different knowledges, and that allowed them to be arranged into a hierarchy. And finally, the corps of inspectors who, throughout the kingdom, advised and counseled people on how to develop and use these different knowledges ensured that knowledge was centralized. I have taken the example of technical knowledges, but the same could be said of medical knowledge. Throughout the whole second half of the eighteenth century we see a huge effort being made to homogenize, normalize, classify, and centralize medical knowledge. How could medical knowledge be given a form and a content, how could homogeneous laws be imposed upon the practice of health care, how could rules be imposed upon the population—not so much to make it share this knowledge, as to make it find it acceptable? All this led to the creation of hospitals, dispensaries, and of the *Société royale de médecine*, the codification of the medical profession, a huge public hygiene campaign, a huge campaign to improve the hygiene of nurslings and children, and so on.<sup>9</sup>

All these projects—and I have cited only two examples—basically had four goals: selection, normalization, hierarchicalization, and centralization. These are the four operations that we see at work in a fairly detailed study of what we call disciplinary power.<sup>10</sup> The eighteenth century was the century when knowledges were disciplined, or when, in other words, the internal organization of every knowledge became a discipline which had, in its own field, criteria of selection that allowed it to eradicate false knowledge or nonknowledge. We also have forms of normalization and homogenization of knowledge-contents, forms of hierarchicalization, and an internal organization

that could centralize knowledges around a sort of de facto axiomatization. So every knowledge was organized into a discipline. These knowledges that had been disciplinarized from within were then arranged, made to communicate with one another, redistributed, and organized into a hierarchy within a sort of overall field or overall discipline that was known specifically as science. Science in the singular did not exist before the eighteenth century. Sciences existed, knowledges existed, and philosophy, if you like, existed. Philosophy was, precisely, the organizational system, the system that allowed knowledges to communicate with one another—and to that extent it could play an effective, real, and operational role within the development of technical knowledges. The disciplinarization of knowledges, and its polymorphous singularity, now leads to the emergence of a phenomenon and a constraint that is now an integral part of our society. We call it "science." At the same time, and for the same reason, philosophy loses its foundational and founding role. Philosophy no longer has any real role to play within science and the processes of knowledge. At the same time, and for the same reasons, *mathesis*—or the project of a universal science that could serve as both a formal instrument for every science and a rigorous foundation for all sciences—also disappears. Science, defined as a general domain, as the disciplinary policing of knowledges, takes over from both philosophy and *mathesis*. From now on, it will raise specific problems relating to the disciplinary policing of knowledges: problems of classification, problems of hierarchicalization, problems of proximity, and so on.

A belief in the progress of reason was the eighteenth century's only awareness of this far-reaching change in the disciplinarization of knowledges and the subsequent elimination of both the philosophical discourse operating within science and the sciences' internal project for a *mathesis*. I think, however, that if we can grasp what was going on beneath what is called the progress of reason—namely the disciplinarization of polymorphous and heterogeneous knowledges—we will be able to understand a certain number of things. First, the appearance of the university. Not of course in the strict sense, as the universities had their function, role, and existence long before this.

But from the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries onward—the Napoleonic university was established at precisely this time—we see the emergence of something like a sort of great uniform apparatus of knowledges, with its different stages, its different extensions, its different levels, and its pseudopodia. The university's primary function is one of selection, not so much of people (which is, after all, basically not very important) as of knowledges. It can play this selective role because it has a sort of de facto—and de jure—monopoly, which means that any knowledge that is not born or shaped within this sort of institutional field—whose limits are in fact relatively fluid but which consists, roughly speaking, of the university and official research bodies—that anything that exists outside it, any knowledge that exists in the wild, any knowledge that is born elsewhere, is automatically, and from the outset, if not actually excluded, disqualified a priori. That the amateur scholar ceased to exist in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is a well-known fact. So the university has a selective role: it selects knowledges. Its role is to distinguish between qualitative and quantitative levels of knowledge, and to distribute knowledges accordingly. Its role is to teach, which means respecting the barriers that exist between the different floors of the university apparatus. Its role is to homogenize knowledges by establishing a sort of scientific community with a recognized status; its role is to organize a consensus. Its role is, finally, to use, either directly or indirectly, State apparatuses to centralize knowledge. We can now understand why something resembling a university, with its ill-defined extensions and frontiers, should have emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century, or in other words at the very time when this disciplinarization of knowledges, this organization of knowledges into disciplines, was going on.

This also allows us to understand a second phenomenon, or what might be termed a change in the form of dogmatism. You see, once the mechanism, or the internal discipline of knowledges, includes controls, and once those controls are exercised by a purpose-built apparatus; once we have this form of control—you must understand this—we can do away with what we might call the orthodoxy of

statements. This old orthodoxy was costly, for this principle, which functioned as a religious or ecclesiastical mode of functioning, had resulted in the condemnation and exclusion of a certain number of statements that were scientifically true and scientifically productive. The discipline, the disciplinarization of knowledges established in the eighteenth century, will replace that orthodoxy, which applied to statements themselves and sorted those that were acceptable out from those that were unacceptable, with something else: a control that applies not to the content of statements themselves, to their conformity or nonconformity to a certain truth, but to the regularity of enunciations. The problem is now: Who is speaking, are they qualified to speak, at what level is the statement situated, what set can it be fitted into, and how and to what extent does it conform to other forms and other typologies of knowledge? This allows a liberalism that is, if not boundless, at least more broad-minded in terms of the content of statements and, on the other hand, more rigorous, more comprehensive—and has a much greater wing area—at the level of enunciatory procedures. As a result, and as you might have deduced, statements could rotate much more quickly, and truths became obsolete much more quickly. As a result, a number of epistemological obstacles could be removed. Just as an orthodoxy that concentrated on the content of statements had become an obstacle to the renewal of the stock of scientific knowledges, so, in contrast, disciplinarization at the level of enunciations allowed the stock to be renewed much more quickly. We move, if you like, from the censorship of statements to the disciplinarization of enunciations, or from orthodoxy to what I would call "orthology," to a form of control that is now exercised on a disciplinary basis.

Right! I've strayed away from the point with all this. We have been studying, looking at how the disciplinary techniques of power," taken at their most subtle or elementary level, taken at the level of individual bodies, succeeded in changing the political economy of power, and modified its apparatuses; we have also seen how disciplinary techniques of power applied to bodies not only led to an accumulation of knowledge, but also identified possible domains of knowledge. We

then saw how the application of disciplines of power to bodies could extract from those subjugated bodies something like a soul-subject, an "ego," a psyche, et cetera. I tried to look at all this last year.<sup>12</sup> I think that we now have to study the emergence of a different form of disciplining, of disciplinarization, which is contemporary with the first but which applies to knowledges and not bodies. And it can, I think, be demonstrated that this disciplinarization of knowledges resulted in both the removal of certain epistemological obstacles and a new form, a new regularity in the proliferation of disciplines. It can be demonstrated that this disciplinarization established a new mode of relationship between power and knowledge. It can, finally, be demonstrated that the disciplinarization of knowledges gave rise to a new constraint: no longer the constraint of truth, but the constraint of science.

All this is taking us away from the historiography of the king, Racine, and Moreau. We could pick up the analysis (but I will not do so now) and show that at the very moment when history, or historical discourse, was entering a general field of conflict, history found itself, for different reasons, in the same position as the technical knowledges I was talking about a moment ago. These technological knowledges, their dispersal, their very morphology, their localized nature, and the secrecy that surrounded them were both an issue and an instrument in an economic struggle and a political struggle. The State intervened in the struggle that these technological knowledges were waging against one another: its function or role was to disciplinarize them, or in other words, to select and homogenize knowledges, and to arrange them into a hierarchy. For very different reasons, historical knowledge entered a field of struggles and battles at much the same time. Not for directly economic reasons, but for reasons pertaining to a struggle, a political struggle. When historical knowledge, which had until then been part of the discourse that the State or power pronounced on itself, was enucleated from that power, and became an instrument in the political struggle that lasted for the whole eighteenth century, the State attempted, in the same way and for the same reason, to take it in hand and disciplinarize it. The

establishment, at the end of the eighteenth century, of a ministry of history, the establishment of the great repository of archives that was to become the *École des Chartes* in the nineteenth century, which more or less coincided with the establishment of the *École des Mines* and the *École des Ponts et Chaussées*—the *École des Ponts et Chaussées* is a little different, not that it matters—also corresponds to the disciplinarization of knowledge. Royal power's objective was to discipline historical knowledge, or historical knowledges, and thus to establish a State knowledge. The difference between this and technological knowledge is that insofar as history was indeed—I think—an anti-State knowledge, there was a perpetual confrontation between the history that had been disciplinarized by the State and that had become the content of official teaching, and the history that was bound up with struggles because it was the consciousness of subjects involved in a struggle. Disciplinarization did not defuse the confrontation. While it can be said that the disciplinarization introduced in the eighteenth century was broadly effective and successful in the realm of technology, where historical knowledge is concerned, disciplinarization did occur, but it not only failed to block the non-Statist history, the decentered history of subjects in struggle, but actually made it stronger thanks to a whole set of struggles, confiscations, and mutual challenges. And to that extent, you always have two levels of historical knowledge and consciousness, and the two levels obviously drift further and further apart. But the gap between the two never prevents either of them from existing. So we have on the one hand a knowledge that has effectively been disciplinarized to form a historical discipline, and on the other hand, a historical consciousness that is polymorphous, divided, and combative. It is simply the other side, the other face of a political consciousness. I would like to try to say a little about these things by looking at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth.

1. Jules Michelet, *Le Peuple* (Paris, 1946).
2. Niccolò Machiavelli, *Il Principe* (Rome, 1532); *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio*, op. cit.; *Dell'arte della guerra* (Florence, 1521); *Istorie fiorentine* (Florence, 1531). There are many French translations of *Il Principe* (English translation by George Bull: *The Prince* [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961]). The other texts referred to may be consulted in E. Barinon, ed., Machiavel, *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1952); this is a revised and updated version of J. Guiraudet's old translations (1798). English translation by Leslie J. Walker: *The Discourse of Niccolò Machiavelli* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950). Foucault discusses Machiavelli in "Omnes et singulatum" (1981) and "The Political Technology of Individuals," and in his lecture "On Governmentality"; cf. note 13 to the lecture of 21 January above.
3. Pierre le Pesant de Boisguilbert, *Le Détail de la France* (s.1. 1695); *Factum de la France* (1707), in *Economistes financiers du XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1843); *Testament politique de M. de Vauban, Maréchal de France*, 2 vols. (s.1. 1707); *Dissertation sur la nature des richesses, de l'argent et des tributs* (Paris, n.d.).
4. Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban, *Méthode générale et facile pour faire le dénombrement des peuples* (Paris, 1686); *Projet d'une dixme royale* (s.1. 1707).
5. On the antihistoricism of contemporary knowledge, see in particular chapter 4 of *Les Mots et les choses* (English translation: *The Order of Things*).
6. The passage in brackets has been reconstructed from Foucault's manuscript.
7. Characters in, respectively, Corneille's *Cinna* and Racine's *Britannicus* and *Andromaque*. [Trans.]
8. The results of the enormous task undertaken by Moreau will be found in his *Principes de morale, de politique, et de droit public*; for examples of the criteria used by Moreau in preparation for this work, and for its history, see also his *Plan des travaux littéraires ordonnés par Sa Majesté*.
9. On the procedures of normalization in medical knowledge, the reader is referred to *Naissance de la clinique: une archéologie du regard médical* (Paris: PUF, 1963) (English translation by Alan Sheridan: *Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Preception* [London: Tavistock, 1973]); the lecture given by Foucault in Brazil in 1974 on the history of medicine, "El nacimiento de la medicina social" ("La Naissance de la médecine sociale," *Dits et écrits*, vol. 3, pp. 207-27); "Incorporación del hospital en la tecnología moderna" ("L'incorporation de l'hôpital dans la technologie moderne," in *Dits et écrits*, vol. 3, pp. 508-21); and the analysis of medical policing made in "La Politique de la santé au XVIIIe siècle," in *Dits et écrits*, vol. 3, pp. 13-27 (English translation: "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century," in *Power/Knowledge*, pp. 166-82); and "La Politique de la santé au XVIIIe siècle," in *Dits et écrits*, vol. 3, pp. 725-41.
10. On disciplinary power and its effects on knowledge, see in particular *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). English translation by Alan Sheridan: *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (London: Allen Lane, 1977).
11. See in particular the lectures given at the Collège de France in 1971-1972: *Théories et institutions pénales*, and in 1972-1973: *La société punitive*, forthcoming.
12. Michel Foucault, *Les Anormaux: Cours au Collège de France, 1974-1975* (Paris: Gallimard and Le Seuil, 1999).