

10. J.-N. Dubos, *Histoire critique de l'établissement de la monarchie française dans les Gaules* (Paris, 1734).
11. J.-N. Moreau, *Leçons de morale, de politique et de droit public, puisées dans l'histoire de la monarchie* (Versailles, 1773); *Exposé historique des administrations populaires aux plus anciennes époques de notre monarchie* (Paris, 1789); *Défense de notre constitution monarchique française, précédée de l'Histoire de toutes nos assemblées nationales* (Paris, 1789).
12. An old expression meaning "to treat someone as the Turks treat the Moors." Dubos writes: "I ask the reader to pay particular attention to the natural humor of the inhabitants of Gaul, who, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, have never been regarded in any century as being stupid or cowardly: as we shall see, it is impossible for a handful of Franks to treat the one million Romans living in Gaul *de turc à Maure*." *Histoire critique*, vol. 4, book 6, pp. 212-13.
13. For Dubos's critique of Boulainvilliers, see *ibid.*, chaps. 8 and 9.
14. It seems that only the last sentence is a direct quotation. Having spoken of the usurpation of royal offices and of how the commissions granted to the dukes and counts were converted into hereditary dignities, Dubos writes: "It was at this time that the Gauls became a conquered land." *Ibid.*, book 4, p. 290 (1742 ed.).
15. G.-B. de Mably, *Observations sur l'histoire de France*.
16. N. de Bonneville, *Histoire de l'Europe moderne depuis l'irruption des peuples du Nord*.
17. Mably, *Observations*, p. 6.
18. L. G. O. F. de Brèquigny, *Diplomata, chartae, epistolae et alia monumenta ad res francicas spectantia* (Paris, 1679-1783); *Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race* (Paris, vol. 11, 1769, vol. 12, 1776).
19. J.-F. Chapsal, *Discours sur la féodalité et l'allodialité, suivi de Dissertations sur la France-alleu des coutumes d'Auvergne, du Bourbonnais, du Nivernois, de Champagne* (Paris, 1791).
20. R.-J. Turgot, *Mémoire sur les municipalités* (Paris, 1776).
21. This passage makes a significant contribution to the debates and controversies provoked by the concept of the episteme, which Foucault elaborates in *Les Mots et les choses* and then reworks in *L'Archéologie du savoir*, part 4, chap. 6.
22. A council held in Pistes (or Pistres) in 864 under the influence of Archbishop Hincmar. Its resolutions are known as the Edict of Pistes. The organization of the monetary system was discussed, the destruction of castles built by seigneurs was ordered, and several towns were given the right to mint coins. The assembly put Pipin II of Aquitaine on trial and declared that he had forfeited his position.
23. The reference is to a motion put to the Jacobin Club on 17 June 1789. Cf. F.-A. Aulard, *La Société des jacobins* (Paris, 1889-1897), vol. 1, p. 153.
24. E. L. H. L., comte d'Antraigues, *Mémoires sur la constitution des Etats provinciaux* (Vivarois, 1788), p. 61.
25. L. B. Proyard, *Vie du Dauphin père de Louis XV* (Paris and Lyon, 1872), vol. 1, pp. 357-58, cited in A. Devyer, *Le Sang épuré*, p. 370.
26. E.-J. Sieyès, *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-Etat*, chap. 2, pp. 10-11. In the original, the sentence begins: "Why shouldn't it [the Third Estate]..."
27. A. J. Boulay de la Meurthe, *Rapport présenté le 25 Vendémiaire an VI au Conseil des Cinq-Cents sur les mesures d'ostracisme, d'exil, d'expulsion les plus convenables aux principes de justice et de liberté, et les plus propres à consolider la république*, cited in A. Devyer, *Le Sang épuré*, p. 415.

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The political reworking of the idea of the nation during the Revolution: Sieyès. - Theoretical implications and effects on historical discourse. - The new history's grids of intelligibility: domination and totalization. - Montlosier and Augustin Thierry. - Birth of the dialectic.

I THINK THAT IN the eighteenth century it was essentially, and almost exclusively, the discourse of history that made war the primary, and almost exclusive, analyzer of political relations. The discourse of history, then, and not the discourse of right and not the discourse of political theory (with its contracts, its savages, its men of the prairies and the forests, its states of nature and its war of every man against every man, and so on). It was not that; it was the discourse of history. So I would now like to show you how, in a rather paradoxical way, the element of war, which actually constituted historical intelligibility in the eighteenth century, was from the Revolution onward gradually, if not eliminated from the discourse of history, at least reduced, restricted, colonized, settled, scattered, civilized if you like, and up to a point pacified. This is because it was, after all, history (as written by Boulainvilliers, or Buat-Nançay, not that it matters) that conjured up the great threat: the great danger that we would be caught up in a war without end; the great danger that all our relations, whatever they might be, would always be of the order of domination. And it is this twofold threat—a war without

end as the basis of history and the relationship of domination as the explanatory element in history—that will, in the historical discourse of the nineteenth century, be lessened, broken down into regional threats and transitory episodes, and retranscribed in the form of crises and violence. What is more important still is, I think, the fact that this danger is, essentially, destined to fade away in the end, not in the sense that we will achieve the good and true equilibrium that the eighteenth-century historians were trying to find, but in the sense that reconciliation will come about.

I do not think that this inversion of the problem of war within the discourse of history is an effect of its transplantation or, so to speak, of the fact that a dialectical philosophy took control. I think that what occurred was something like an internal dialecticalization, a self-dialecticalization of historical discourse, and that there is an obvious connection between this and its embourgeoisement. The problem we have to understand is this: How, after this displacement (if not decline) of the role of war within historical discourse, does the relationship of war—which has been mastered within historical discourse—reappear, but this time with a negative role, with a sort of external role? Its role is no longer to constitute history but to protect and preserve society; war is no longer a condition of existence for society and political relations, but the precondition for its survival in its political relations. At this point, we see the emergence of the idea of an internal war that defends society against threats born of and in its own body. The idea of social war makes, if you like, a great retreat from the historical to the biological, from the constituent to the medical.

Today I am going to try to describe the process of the auto-dialecticalization, and therefore the embourgeoisement, of history, of historical discourse. Last time, I tried to show you how and why, in the historico-political field that was constituted in the eighteenth century, it was ultimately the bourgeoisie that was in the most difficult position, that found it most difficult to use the discourse of history as a weapon in the political fight. I would now like to show you how certain obstacles were removed. This certainly did not occur because the bourgeoisie at some point somehow acquired a history or recog-

nized its own history, but as a result of something very specific: the reworking—in political and not historical terms—of the famous notion of the "nation," which the aristocracy had made both the subject and the object of history in the eighteenth century. It was that role, that political reworking of the nation, of the idea of the nation, that led to the transformation that made a new type of historical discourse possible. And I will take Sieyès's famous text on the Third Estate as, if not exactly a starting point, an example of this transformation. As you know, the text asks three questions: "What is the Third Estate? Everything. What has it been until now in the political order? Nothing. What is it asking to be? To become something in that order." The text is both famous and hackneyed, but if we look at it a little more closely, it does, I think, bring about a number of essential transformations.

Speaking of the nation, you know in general terms (I am going over things I have already said in order to summarize them) that the absolute monarchy's thesis was that the nation did not exist, or at least that if it did exist, it did so only to the extent that it found its condition of possibility, and its substantive unity, in the person of the king. The nation did not exist simply because there was a group, a crowd, or a multiplicity of individuals inhabiting the same land, speaking the same language, and observing the same customs and the same laws. That is not what makes a nation. What makes a nation is the fact that there exist individuals who, insofar as they exist alongside one another, are no more than individuals and do not even form a unit. But they do all have a certain individual relationship—both juridical and physical—with the real, living, and bodily person of the king. It is the body of the king, in his physico-juridical relationship with each of his subjects, that creates the body of the nation. A jurist of the late eighteenth century said: "Every particular subject represents only a single individual to the king."* The nation does not

*The manuscript has "the king represents the entire nation and" before "every particular." The reference for the quotation is given as "P. E. Lemontey, *Oeuvres*, Paris, vol. V, 1829, p. 15."

constitute a body. The nation in its entirety resides in the person of the king. And the nobiliary reaction derived a multiplicity of nations (well, at least two) from this nation—which is in a sense merely a juridical effect of the body of the king, and which is real only because of the unique and individual reality of the king. The nobiliary reaction then establishes relations of war and domination between those nations; it makes the king an instrument that one nation can use to wage war on and dominate another. It is not the king who constitutes the nation; a nation acquires a king for the specific purpose of fighting other nations. And the history written by the nobiliary reaction made those relations the web of historical intelligibility.

We find a very different definition of the nation in Sieyès, or rather a double definition. On the one hand, a juridical state. Sieyès says that if a nation is to exist, it must have two things: a common law and a legislature.² So much for the juridical state. This initial definition of the nation (or rather this first set of essential preconditions for the existence of a nation) demands—before we can speak of a nation—much less than was demanded by the definition advanced by the absolute monarchy. The nation does not, in other words, need a king in order to exist. It is not even necessary for there to be a government. Provided that it is endowed with a common law because there is an agency that is qualified to establish laws, the nation exists even before any government is formed, even before the sovereign is born, and even before power is delegated. That agency is the legislature itself. So the nation is much less than what was required by the absolute monarchy's definition. But in another sense, it is much more than what was required by the nobiliary reaction's definition. According to that definition, and according to history as written by Boulainvilliers, all that was required for the nation to exist were men who were brought together by certain interests, and who had a certain number of things in common, such as customs, habits, and possibly a language.

If there is to be a nation, there must, according to Sieyès, be explicit laws, and agencies to formulate them. The law-legislature couple is

the formal precondition for the existence of a nation. This is, however, only the first stage of the definition. If a nation is to survive, if its law is to be applied and if its legislature is to be recognized (not only abroad, or by other nations, but also within the nation itself), if its survival and prosperity are to be not only a formal precondition for its juridical existence, but also a historical precondition for its existence *in* history, then there must be something else, other preconditions. Sieyès now turns his attention to these other preconditions. They are in a sense the substantive preconditions for the existence of the nation, and Sieyès divides them into two groups. The first are what he calls "works," or first, agriculture; second, handicrafts and industry; third, trade; and, fourth, the liberal arts. But in addition to these "works," there must also be what he calls "functions": the army, justice, the church, and the administration.³ "Works" and "functions"; we would no doubt use the more accurate terms "functions" and "apparatuses" to describe these two sets of historical prerequisites for nationhood. The important point is, however, that it is at this level of functions and apparatuses that the nation's historical conditions of existence are defined. By defining them at this level, and by introducing historical conditions as juridico-formal preconditions for nationhood, Sieyès is, I think (and this is the first thing that has to be pointed out), reversing the direction of all previous analyses, no matter whether they adopted the monarchist thesis or took a Rousseauist line.

Indeed, so long as the juridical definition of the nation prevailed, what were the elements—agriculture, commerce, industry, et cetera—that Sieyès isolates as the substantive preconditions for the existence of the nation? They were not a precondition for the nation's existence; on the contrary, they were effects of the nation's existence. It was precisely when men, or individuals scattered across the surface of the land, on the edges of the forests or on the plains, decided to develop their agriculture, to trade and to be able to have economic relations with one another, that they gave themselves a law, a State, or a government. In other words, all these functions were in fact effects of the juridical constitution of the nation, or at least its consequences. It was

only when the juridical constitution of the nation was an established fact that these functions could be deployed. Nor were apparatuses such as the army, justice, and the administration preconditions for the existence of the nation; they were, if not effects, at least its instruments and guarantors. It was only when the nation had been constituted that it could acquire things like an army or a system of justice.

So you see, Sieyès inverts the analysis. His works and functions, or these functions and apparatuses, exist before the nation—if not in historical terms, at least in terms of conditions of existence. A nation can exist as a nation, and can enter history and survive through history, only if it is capable of commerce, agriculture, and handicrafts; only if it has individuals who are capable of forming an army, a magistrature, a church, and an administration. This means that a group of individuals can always come together and can always give itself laws and a legislature; it can give itself a constitution. If that group of individuals does not have the capacity for commerce, handicrafts, and agriculture, or the ability to form an army, a magistrature, and so on, it will never, in historical terms, be a nation. It might be a nation in juridical terms, but never in historical terms. A contract, a law, or a consensus can never really create a nation. Conversely, it is perfectly possible for a group of individuals to have the wherewithal, the historical ability to develop works, to exercise functions, without ever having been given a common law and a legislature. Such people would, in a sense, be in possession of the substantive and functional elements of the nation; they are not in possession of its formal elements. They are capable of nationhood, but they will not be a nation.

On the basis of this, it is possible to analyze—and Sieyès does analyze—what he thought was going on in France at the end of the eighteenth century. Agriculture, commerce, handicrafts, and the liberal arts do exist. Who fulfills these various functions? The Third Estate, and only the Third Estate. Who runs the army, the church, the administration, and the system of justice? We do of course find

people belonging to the aristocracy in important positions, but according to Sieyès, it is the Third Estate that runs nine out of ten of these apparatuses. On the other hand, the Third Estate, which has assumed responsibility for the nation's substantive conditions of existence, has not been given the formal status of a nation. There are no common laws in France; there is a series of laws, some applicable to the nobility, some to the Third Estate, and some to the clergy. No common laws. No legislature either, because laws and ordinances are established by what Sieyès calls an "aulic" system,³ meaning a courtly system, or arbitrary royal power.

This analysis has, I think, a number of implications. Some are obviously of an immediately political order. They are immediately political in this sense: the point is, you see, that France is not a nation, because it lacks the formal, juridical preconditions for nationhood: common laws and a legislature. And yet there is "a" nation in France, or in other words, a group of individuals who have the potential capacity to ensure the substantive and historical existence of the nation. These people supply the historical conditions of existence of both *a* nation and *the* nation. Hence the central formulation of Sieyès's text, which cannot be understood unless we quite specifically see it in terms of its polemical—explicitly polemical—relationship with the theses of Boulainvilliers, Buat-Nançay, and the rest of them: "The Third Estate is a complete nation."⁵ The formula means this: This concept of nation, which the aristocracy wanted to reserve for a group of individuals whose only assets were common customs and a common status, is not enough to describe the historical reality of the nation. But, on the other hand, the Statist entity constituted by the kingdom of France is not really a nation to the extent that it does not exactly coincide with the historical conditions that are necessary and sufficient to constitute a nation. Where, then, are we to find the historical core of a nation that can become "the" nation? In the Third Estate, and only in the Third Estate. The Third Estate is in itself the historical precondition for the existence of a nation, but that nation should, by rights, coincide with the State. The Third Estate is a nation. It con-

tains the constituent elements of a nation. Or, to translate the same propositions differently: "All that is national is ours," says the Third Estate, "and all that is ours is the nation."⁶

Sieyès did not invent this political formula, and he was not alone in formulating it, but it obviously becomes the matrix for a whole political discourse which, as you well know, is still not exhausted today. The matrix of this political discourse displays, I think, two characteristics. First, a certain new relationship between particularity and universality, a certain relationship which is precisely the opposite of that which characterized the discourse of the nobiliary reaction. What, basically, did the nobiliary reaction do? It extracted from the social body constituted by the king and his subjects, it extracted from the monarchic unity, a certain singular right that was sealed in blood and asserted by victory: the singular right of the nobles. And it claimed, whatever the constitution of the social body that surrounded it, to reserve the absolute and singular privilege of that right for the nobility; it extracted, then, this particular right from the totality of the social body and made it function in its singularity. And now, something quite different is beginning to be said. It is beginning to be said that, on the contrary (and this is what the Third Estate will say): "We are no more than one nation among other individuals. But the nation that we constitute is the only one that can effectively constitute the nation. Perhaps we are not, in ourselves, the totality of the social body, but we are capable of guaranteeing the totalizing function of the State. We are capable of Statist universality." And so, and this is the second characteristic of this discourse, we have an inversion of the temporal axis of the demand. The demand will no longer be articulated in the name of a past right that was established by either a consensus, a victory, or an invasion. The demand can now be articulated in terms of a potentiality, a future, a future that is immediate, which is already present in the present because it concerns a certain function of Statist universality that is already fulfilled by "a" nation within the social body, and which is therefore demanding that its status as a single nation must be effectively recognized, and recognized in the juridical form of the State.

So much, if you like, for the political implications of this type of analysis and discourse. It has theoretical implications too, and they are as follows. You see, what, in these conditions, defines a nation is not its archaism, its ancestral nature, or its relationship with the past; it is its relationship with something else, with the State. This means several things. First, that the nation is not essentially specified by its relations with other nations. What characterizes "the" nation is not a horizontal relationship with other groups (such as other nations, hostile or enemy nations, or the nations with which it is juxtaposed). What does characterize the nation is, in contrast, a vertical relationship between a body of individuals who are capable of constituting a State, and the actual existence of the State itself. It is in terms of this vertical nation/State axis, or this Statist potentiality/Statist realization axis, that the nation is to be characterized and situated. This also means that what constitutes the strength of a nation is not so much its physical vigor, its military aptitudes, or, so to speak, its barbarian intensity, which is what the noble historians of the early eighteenth century were trying to describe. What does constitute the strength of a nation is now something like its capacities, its potentialities, and they are all organized around the figure of the State: the greater a nation's Statist capacity, or the greater its potential, the stronger it will be. Which also means that the defining characteristic of a nation is not really its dominance over other nations. The essential function and the historical role of the nation is not defined by its ability to exercise a relationship of domination over other nations. It is something else: its ability to administer itself, to manage, govern, and guarantee the constitution and workings of the figure of the State and of State power. Not domination, but State control. The nation is therefore no longer a partner in barbarous and warlike relations of domination. The nation is the active, constituent core of the State. The nation is the State, or at least an outline State. It is the State insofar as it is being born, is being shaped and is finding its historical conditions of existence in a group of individuals.

Those are, if you like, the theoretical implications at the level of what is understood by "nation." Now for its implications for historical

discourse. What we now have is a historical discourse which reintroduces the problem of the State and which, up to a point, once more sees it as its central problem. And to that extent, we have a historical discourse which, up to a point, is close to the historical discourse that existed in the seventeenth century and which was, as I have tried to show you, essentially a way of allowing the State to talk about itself. The functions of that discourse were justificatory or liturgical: the State recounted its own past, or in other words, established its own legitimacy by making itself stronger, so to speak, at the level of its basic rights. This was still the discourse of history in the seventeenth century. It was against this discourse that the nobiliary reaction launched its scathing attack, or a different type of discourse in which the nation was, precisely, something that could be used to break down the unity of the State and to demonstrate that, beneath the formal facade of the State, there were other forces and that they were precisely not forces of the State, but the forces of a particular group with its own history, its own relationship with the past, its own victories, its own blood, and its own relations of domination.

We now have a discourse on history that is more sympathetic to the State and which is no longer, in its essential functions, anti-State. The objective of this new history is not, however, to let the State speak its own self-justificatory discourse. It is to write the history of the relations that are forever being woven between nation and State, between the nation's Statist potential and the actual totality of the State. This makes it possible to write a history which will obviously not become trapped in the circle of revolution and reconstitution, of a revolutionary return to the primitive order of things, as was the case in the seventeenth century. What we do now have, or what we may have, is a history of a rectilinear kind in which the decisive moment is the transition from the virtual to the real, the transition from the national totality to the universality of the State. This, therefore, is a history that is polarized toward the present and toward the State, a history that culminates in the imminence of the State, of the total, complete, and full figure of the State in the present. And

this will also make it possible—second point—to write a history in which the relations of force that are in play are not of a warlike nature, but completely civilian, so to speak.

I tried to show you how, in Boulainvilliers's analysis, the clash between the different nations that exist within a single social body is of course mediated by institutions (the economy, education, language, knowledge, et cetera). But the use of civil institutions was, in his analysis, purely instrumental, and the war was still basically a war. Institutions were merely the instruments of a domination which was still a domination of the warlike kind, like an invasion. We now have, in contrast, a history in which war—the war for domination—will be replaced by a struggle that is, so to speak, of a different substance: not an armed clash, but an effort, a rivalry, a striving toward the universality of the State. The State, and the universality of the State, become both what is at stake in the struggle, and the battlefield. This will therefore be an essentially civil struggle to the extent that domination is neither its goal nor its expression, and to the extent that the State is both its object and its space. It will take place essentially in and around the economy, institutions, production, and the administration. We will have a civil struggle, and the military struggle or bloody struggle will become no more than an exceptional moment, a crisis or an episode within it. Far from being the real content of every confrontation and every struggle, the civil war will in fact be no more than an episode, a critical phase in a struggle that now has to be seen not in terms of war or domination, but in nonmilitary or civilian terms.

And this, I think, raises one of the basic questions about history and politics, not only in the nineteenth century, but also in the twentieth. How can we understand a struggle in purely civilian terms? Can what we call struggle—the economic struggle, the political struggle, the struggle for the State—actually be analyzed not in terms of war, but in truly economico-political terms? Or do we have to go beyond all that and discover precisely the never-ending substratum of war and domination that the historians of the eighteenth century were trying to locate? From the nineteenth century onward, or after

the redefinition of the notion of the nation, we do at least have a new history. It differs from the history written in the eighteenth century in that it is trying to find within the space of the State, the civil basis for the struggle that must replace the warlike, military, and bloody basis discovered by the historians of the eighteenth century.

We have here, if you like, the new historical discourse's conditions of possibility. What concrete form will this new history take? I think that if we want to describe it in overall terms, we can say that it will be characterized by the interplay between, the fitting together, of two grids of intelligibility that are juxtaposed, that intersect, and that, up to a point, correct each other. The first is the grid of intelligibility that was constructed and used in the eighteenth century. When Guizot, Augustin Thierry, and Thiers—and Michelet too—write history, they take as their starting point a relationship of force, a relationship of struggle, and it takes a form that had already been recognized in the eighteenth century: a war, a battle, an invasion, or a conquest. And historians of, say, the type that is still aristocratic, such as Montlosier⁷ (but also Augustin Thierry, and Guizot too) always assume that this struggle is the matrix of, if you like, a history. Augustin Thierry, for example, says: "We believe ourselves to be a nation, but we are two nations within one land, two nations which are enemies because of what they remember and because their projects are irreconcilable: one once conquered the other." Of course some of the masters have gone over to the side of the vanquished, but the others, or those who remained masters, are "as foreign to our affections and our customs as if they had come among us yesterday, as deaf to our words of freedom and peace as if our language were as unknown to them as that of our ancestors was unknown to theirs. They went their own way, and took no heed of our way."⁸ And Guizot said: "For more than thirteen centuries, France contained two peoples: a victorious people and a vanquished people."⁹ So even at this time, we still have the same starting point, the same grid of intelligibility, as in the eighteenth century.

In addition to this first grid, there is another, and it both complements and inverts this primal duality. This is a grid which, rather

than functioning with a point of origin such as the first war, the first invasion, or the first national duality, works backward and starts with the present. The fundamental moment is no longer the origin, and intelligibility's starting point is no longer the archaic element; it is, on the contrary, the present. And we have here, I think, an important phenomenon: the inversion of the value of the present in historical and political discourse. In the history and the historico-political field of the eighteenth century, the present was, basically, always the negative moment. It was always the trough of the wave, always a moment of apparent calm and forgetfulness. The present was the moment when, thanks to a whole series of displacements, betrayals, and modifications of the relationship of force, the primitive state of war had become, as it were, muddled and unrecognizable. Not just unrecognizable, but completely forgotten by those who should have been able to use it to their advantage. The nobles' ignorance, absentmindedness, laziness, and greed, all that had made them forget the basic force-relations that defined their relationship with the other people living on their lands. And what is more, the discourse of royal power's clerks, jurists, and administrators had covered up this initial relationship of force. For eighteenth-century history, the present was therefore always the moment of a profound forgetfulness. Hence the need to escape the present thanks to a sudden and violent reawakening that must begin, first and foremost, with a great reactivation of the primitive moment in the order of knowledge. The present was a moment of extreme forgetfulness; it was also the moment when a consciousness must be reawakened.

And now we have a very different grid of historical intelligibility. Once history is polarized around the nation/State, virtuality/actuality, functional totality of the nation/real universality of the State, you can see clearly that the present becomes the fullest moment, the moment of the greatest intensity, the solemn moment when the universal makes its entry into the real. It is at this point that the universal comes into contact with the real in the present (a present that has just passed and will pass), in the imminence of the present, and it is this that gives the present both its value and its intensity, and that

establishes it as a principle of intelligibility. The present is no longer the moment of forgetfulness. On the contrary, it is the moment when the truth comes out, when what was obscure or virtual is revealed in the full light of day. As a result, the present both reveals the past and allows it to be analyzed.

I think that history, as we see it functioning in the nineteenth century, or at least the first half of the nineteenth century, uses both grids of intelligibility. It uses both the grid that begins with the initial war which runs through all historical processes and impels all their developments, and a different grid of intelligibility which works backward from the topicality of the present, from the totalizing realization of the State to the past, and which reconstitutes its genesis. The two grids in fact never function in isolation: they are always used almost concurrently, always overlap, are more or less superimposed, and to some extent intersect at the edges. Basically, we have on the one hand a history written in the form of domination—with war in the background—and on the other, a history written in the form of totalization—a history in which what has happened and what is going to happen, namely the emergence of the State, exists, or is at least imminent, in the present. A history that is written, then, both in terms of an initial rift and a totalizing completion. And I think that the utility, the political utilizability, of historical discourse is basically defined by the interplay between these two grids, or by the way in which one or the other of them is privileged.

Broadly speaking, if the first grid of intelligibility—the initial rift—is privileged, the result will be a history that can, if you like, be described as reactionary, aristocratic, and rightist. If the second—the present moment of universality—is privileged, we will have a history of the liberal or bourgeois type. But neither of these histories, each of which has its own tactical position, can actually avoid having to use both grids in one way or another. I would like to show you two examples of this. One is borrowed from a typically rightist or aristocratic history which is, up to a point, a direct descendant of eighteenth-century history but which in fact displaces it considerably and does, despite everything, work with the grid of intelligibility that

takes the present as its starting point. The other is a converse example: I will, in other words, take a historian who is regarded as liberal and bourgeois, and show the play between the two grids and even the grid of intelligibility that begins with war, even though historians like this do not privilege it in any absolute sense.

So, first example. In the early nineteenth century, Montlosier appears to be writing a history of the rightist type in the tradition of the nobiliary reaction of the eighteenth century. In such a history, we do indeed find that relations of domination are privileged from the outset: throughout history, we find the relationship of national duality, and the relation of domination characteristic of national duality. Montlosier's book is—Montlosier's books are—full of polemics like this one, which is addressed to the Third Estate: "You are an emancipated race, a race of slaves, a tributary people, you were given license to be free, but not to be noble. For us, it is all a matter of right; for you, it is all a matter of grace. We do not belong to your community; we are a whole unto ourselves." Once again, you find the famous theme I told you about when we were discussing Sieyès. Similarly, Jouffroy could write a sentence such as this in some journal or other (I can't remember which): "The northern race seized Gaul without driving out the vanquished; it bequeathed its successors conquered lands to be governed, and conquered men to rule."¹⁰

The national duality thesis is asserted by all those historians who are, broadly speaking, émigrés who returned to France and who, at the time of the ultrareaction, reconstructed the invasion as a sort of privileged moment. But if we look at it more closely, Montlosier's analysis functions very differently from the analysis we saw in the eighteenth century. Montlosier obviously does speak of a relation of domination that results from a war, or rather a multiplicity of wars, but he does not really try to situate it. And he says that the important thing is not really what happened at the time of the Frankish invasion, because relations of domination existed long before that and because they were multiple. Long before the Romans invaded Gaul, there was already a relation of domination between a nobility and a people that paid it tribute. It was the result of an ancient war. The Romans came,

and brought their war with them, but they also brought the relationship of domination that existed between their aristocracy and people who were no more than the clients of those rich people, those nobles and aristocrats. That relationship of domination resulted from an old war too. And then the Germans came along, with their own internal relationship of subjugation between those who were free warriors and those who were merely subjects. So what happened at the beginning of the Middle Ages, at the dawn of feudalism, was not just that a victorious people was superimposed on a vanquished people. What was established was a combination of three systems of internal domination: that of the Gauls, that of the Romans, and that of the Germans.¹¹ The feudal nobility of the Middle Ages was, at bottom, no more than a mixture of three aristocracies, and it established itself as a new aristocracy that exercised a relationship of domination over people who were themselves a mixture of Gaulish tributaries, Roman clients, and German subjects. As a result, we have a relationship of domination between something which was a nobility, which was a nation, but which was also the nation in its entirety, or in other words the feudal nobility; and then we have (outside that nation, or as an object or partner in that relationship of domination) a whole people of tributaries, serfs, and so on who are not really the other part of that nation, who exist outside it. Montlosier, then, operates with a monism at the level of the nation, and with a dualism at the level of domination.

And what, according to Montlosier, is the monarchy's role in all this? Well, the role of the monarchy is to forge this extranational mass—the product, the mixture of German subjects, Roman clients, and Gaulish tributaries—into a nation, into a different people. That is the role of royal power. The monarchy freed tributaries, granted rights to the towns and made them independent of the nobility; it even freed the serfs and created from scratch what Montlosier calls a new people. It had the same rights as the old people, or in other words, the nobility, but it was numerically superior. Royal power, says Montlosier, created an immense class.¹²

This type of analysis does of course reactivate all the elements we

saw being used in the eighteenth century, but with one important modification. The difference is, you see, that in Montlosier's view, the processes of politics—all that had happened between the Middle Ages and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—did not simply modify or displace the relations of force that existed between two partners who were there from the outset, and who had been enemies ever since the invasion. What happened was that something new was created within an entity that was once mononational and totally concentrated around the nobility: a new nation, a new people, or what Montlosier calls a new class was created.¹³ The making, then, of a class, of classes, within the social body. Now, what will happen once this new class has been created? The king will use this new class to take away the nobility's economic and political privileges. What means does he use? Once again, Montlosier repeats what his predecessors had said: lies, betrayals, unnatural alliances, and so on. The king also used the raw energy of this new class; he uses the rebellions: urban rebellions against feudal lords, and peasant jacqueries against landowners. And what, asks Montlosier, do we see at work in these rebellions? The discontent of the new class, obviously. But above all, the hand of the king. It was the king who inspired all the rebellions, because every rebellion weakened the power of the nobles and therefore strengthened the power of the king, who urged the nobles to make concessions. And thanks to a circular process, every royal act of emancipation made the people stronger and more arrogant. Every concession the king made to this new class led to further rebellions. Monarchy and popular rebellion worked hand in glove. And the weapons that were used to transfer to the monarch all of the political powers the nobility once had were essentially these rebellions, these rebellions that were fomented and inspired, or at least supported and encouraged, by royal power.

Once this has been done, the monarchy itself usurps power, but it can make it function, or can exercise it, only by turning to this new class. It therefore entrusts its justice and administration to this new class, which finds itself in control of all the functions of the State. As a result, the final moment of the process can only be the ultimate

rebellion: having fallen into the hands of this new class, or into the hands of the people, the State is no longer under the control of royal power. All that remains is a naked encounter between a king who has in reality only the power he has been given by popular rebellions, and a popular class which has all the instruments of the State in its hands. This is the final episode, the final rebellion. Against whom? Against the man who has forgotten that he was the last aristocrat who still had any power: the king.

In Montlosier's analysis, the French Revolution therefore looks like the final episode in the transferential process that established royal absolutism.¹⁴ The Revolution completes the constitution of monarchic power. But surely the Revolution overthrew the king? Not at all. The Revolution finished what the kings had begun, and literally speaks its truth. The Revolution has to be read as the culmination of the monarchy; a tragic culmination perhaps, but a culmination that is politically true. The king may well have been decapitated during that scene on 21 January 1793; they decapitated the king, but they crowned the monarchy. The Convention is the truth of the monarchy stripped bare, and the sovereignty that the king snatched away from the nobility is now, in a way that is absolutely necessary, in the hands of a people which, according to Montlosier, proves to be the kings' legitimate heir. Montlosier, aristocrat, émigré, and savage opponent of the least attempt at liberalization under the Restoration, can write this: "The sovereign people: we should not condemn it with too much bitterness. It is simply consummating the work of its sovereign predecessors." The people is therefore the heir, and the legitimate heir, of the kings; it is simply completing the work of the sovereigns who preceded it. It followed, point by point, the route traced for it by kings, by *parlementaires*, by men of the law, and by scholars. As you can see, then, Montlosier's historical analysis is framed by the thesis that it all began with a state of war and a relation of domination. The political demands put forward during the Restoration period certainly included the claim that the rights of the nobility must be restored, that the property that had been nationalized should be returned to it, and that the relations of domination it had once exercised over the

whole people should be reestablished. Of course that assertion was made, but you can see that the nucleus, the central content of the historical discourse that is being spoken is indeed a historical discourse that makes the present function as the moment of fullness. It is the moment of effectuation, the moment of totalization. From this moment [onward] all the historical processes that established relations between the aristocracy and the monarchy finally reach their culminating point in the constitution of a Statist totality that is in the hands of a national collectivity. And to that extent, we can say that—regardless of the political themes or the elements of the analysis that are borrowed from the history of Boulainvilliers or Buat-Nançay, or which are directly transposed from it—this discourse actually functions in accordance with a different model.

To close, I would like to take a different, a diametrically different, type of history. It is the history of Augustin Thierry, who was Montlosier's explicit adversary. For Thierry, history's privileged point of intelligibility is, of course, the present. He is quite explicit about this. It is the second grid, which begins with the present, with the fullness of the present, so as to reveal the elements and processes of the past, that will be used. Statist totalization; that is what must be projected onto the past. We have to trace the genesis of that totalization. For Augustin Thierry, the present is indeed "that moment of fullness." The Revolution is—he says—the moment of reconciliation. The setting for this reconciliation, for this constitution of the Statist totality, is the famous scene when Bailly, you know, welcomed the representatives of the nobility and the clergy into the very place where the representatives of the Third Estate were meeting, with the words: "Now the family is reunited."¹⁵

So let us start with the present. The present moment is that of national totalization in the form of the State. But the fact remains that this totalization could occur only through the violent process of the Revolution, and that this full moment of reconciliation still has the features—and bears the scars—of a war. And Augustin Thierry says that the French Revolution was, basically, nothing more than the final episode in a struggle that had been going on for more than

thirteen hundred years, and that it was a struggle between the victors and the vanquished.¹⁶ According to Augustin Thierry, the whole problem of historical analysis is to show how a struggle between victors and vanquished that goes on throughout history can lead to a present that no longer takes the form of a war and a dissymmetrical domination which either perpetuates them or takes them in a different direction; the problem is to show how such a war could lead to the genesis of a universality in which struggles, or at least war, inevitably cease.

Why is it that only one of these two parties can be the agent of universality? That, for Augustin Thierry, is the problem of history. And his analysis therefore consists in tracing the origins of a process that was dualistic when it began, but both monist and universalist when it ended. According to Augustin Thierry, the important thing about this confrontation is that what happened obviously has its starting point in something like an invasion. But although the struggle or confrontation went on throughout the Middle Ages and is still going on, that is not because the victors and the vanquished clashed within institutions; it is because two different societies were constituted. They were not of the same economico-juridical type, and they fought over the administration and over who controlled the State. Even before medieval society was established, a rural society did exist: it was organized after the conquest and in a form that very quickly developed into feudalism. And then there emerged a rival urban society based on both a Roman model and a Gaulish model. In one sense, the confrontation was basically the result of the invasion and the conquest, but it was essentially, or in substantive terms, a struggle between two societies. The conflict between the two did at times take the form of armed conflict, but for the most part it took that of a political and economic confrontation. It may well have been a war, but it was a war between right and freedoms on one side, and debt and wealth on the other.

The confrontation between these two types of society over the constitution of a State will become the basic motor of history. Until the ninth or tenth century, the towns were on the losing side in this

confrontation, in this struggle for the State and the universality of the State. And then, from the tenth and eleventh centuries onward, the towns underwent a renaissance. Those in the south adopted the Italian model, and the towns of the northern regions adopted the Nordic model. In both cases, a new form of juridical and economic organization came into being. And the reason urban society eventually triumphed is not at all that it won something like a military victory, but quite simply that it had wealth on its side, but also an administrative ability, a morale, a certain way of life, what Augustin Thierry calls innovatory instincts, and its activity. All these things gave it such strength that, one day, its institutions ceased to be local and became the country's institutions of political right and civil right. Universalization therefore began not with a relationship of domination that gradually swung completely in its favor, but with the fact that all the constituent elements of the State were born of it, were in its hands or had come into its hands. Its force was the force of the State and not the force of war, and the bourgeoisie did not make warlike use of it except when it was really obliged to do so.

There are two great episodes, two main phases in this history of the bourgeoisie and the Third Estate. First, when the Third Estate sensed that it was in control of all the forces of the State, what it proposed to the nobility and the clergy was, well, a sort of social pact. Hence the emergence of both the theory and the institutions of the three orders. This was, however, an artificial unity that did not really correspond to either the realities of the relationship of force or the will of the enemy. The Third Estate had in fact the whole State in its hands, and its enemy, or in other words, the nobility, refused to recognize that the Third Estate had any right at all. It was at this point, in the eighteenth century, that a new process began, and it was to be a more violent process of confrontation. And the Revolution itself was to be the final episode in a violent war. It naturally reactivated the old conflicts, but it was, in some sense, nothing more than the military instrument of a conflict and struggle that were not in themselves warlike. They were essentially civil, and the State was both their object and the space in which they took place. The disappear-

ance of the three-order system, and the violent shocks of the Revolution, simply provided a backdrop for a single event: this is the moment when, having become a nation and then having become the nation by absorbing all the functions of the State, the Third Estate will effectively take sole control of both nation and State. The fact that it alone is the nation and that the State is under its sole control allows it to assume the functions of universality which will automatically do away with both the old duality and all the relations of domination that have hitherto been at work. The bourgeoisie or Third Estate thus becomes the people, and thus becomes the nation. It has the might of the universal. And the present moment—the moment when Augustin Thierry is writing—is precisely the moment when dualities, nations, and even classes cease to exist. "An immense evolution," said Thierry, "which causes all violent or illegitimate inequalities—master and slave, victor and vanquished, lord and serf—to vanish one by one from the land in which we live. In their place, it finally reveals one people, one law that applies to all and one free and sovereign nation."¹⁷

So you see, with analyses like this we obviously have, first, the elimination of war's function as an analyzer of historico-political processes, or at least its strict curtailment. War is now no more than an ephemeral and instrumental aspect of confrontations which are not of a warlike nature. Second, the essential element is no longer the relationship of domination that exists between one nation and another or one group and another; the fundamental relationship is the State. And you can also see, in analyses like this, the outline of something that can, in my view, be immediately likened, immediately transposed, to a philosophical discourse of a dialectical type.

The possibility of a philosophy of history, or in other words the appearance, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, of a philosophy that finds in history, and in the plenitude of the present, the moment when the universal speaks its truth, you see—I am not saying that the ground is being prepared for this philosophy; I am saying that it is already at work within historical discourse. What took place was a self dialecticalization of historical discourse, and it occurred

independently of any explicit transposition—or any explicit utilization—of a dialectical philosophy into a historical discourse. But the bourgeoisie's utilization of a historical discourse, the bourgeoisie's modification of the basic elements of the historical intelligibility that it had picked up from the eighteenth century, was at the same time a self-dialecticalization of historical discourse. And so you can understand how, from this point onward, relations could be established between the discourse of history and the discourse of philosophy. Basically, the philosophy of history did not exist in the eighteenth century, except in the form of speculations about the general law of history. From the nineteenth century onward something new—and, I think, something fundamental—began to happen. History and philosophy began to ask the same question: What is it, in the present, that is the agent of the universal? What is it, in the present, that is the truth of the universal? That is the question asked by history. It is also the question asked by philosophy. The dialectic is born.

1. E.-J. Sieyès, *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-Etat?* p. 1.
2. "A common law and a common representation, that is what makes a nation." Ibid., p. 12.
3. "What is required for the survival and prosperity of a Nation? *Particular works and public functions.*" Ibid., p. 2; cf. chap. 1, pp. 2-9.
4. Ibid., chap. 2, p. 17.
5. Ibid., chap. 1, p. 2.
6. "The Third Estate comprises all that belongs to the nation; and all that is not the Third Estate cannot be regarded as belonging to the nation. What is the Third Estate? Everything." Ibid., p. 9.
7. F. de Reynaud, comte de Montlosier, *De la monarchie française depuis son établissement jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1814), vols. 1-3.
8. Augustin Thierry, "Sur l'antipathie de race qui divise la nation française," *Le Censeur européen*, 2 April 1820, reprinted in *Dix ans d'études historiques* (Paris, 1935), p. 292.
9. F. Guizot, *Du Gouvernement de la France depuis la Restauration et du ministre actuel* (Paris, 1820), p. 1.
10. Foucault is alluding to Achille Jouffroy d'Abbans (1790-1859). He was a supporter of the Bourbons and published articles supporting divine right, absolute power, and ultra-Montanism in *L'Observateur*. After the fall of Charles X, he published a journal called *La Légimité*, which was banned from being distributed in France. He is the author of, inter alia, a brochure entitled *Des Idées libérales du Français* (1815), a novel about the Revolution entitled *Les Fastes de l'anarchie* (1820), and a historical study of Gaul, *Les Siècles de la monarchie française* (1823). The quotation from Jouffroy is from *L'Observateur des colonies, de la marine, de la politique, de la littérature et des arts*, 9th installment (1820), p. 299. Cf. A. Thierry, "Sur l'antipathie de race..."
11. F. de Reynaud, comte de Montlosier, *De la monarchie française*, book 1, chap. 1, p. 150.
12. Ibid., book 3, chap. 2, p. 152f.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., book 2, chap. 3, p. 209.
15. A. Thierry, *Essai sur l'histoire de la formation et du progrès du Tiers-Etat*, in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris, 1868), vol. 5, p. 3. Thierry writes: "The family is complete."
16. See in particular A. Thierry, "Sur l'antipathie de race..." and "Histoire véritable de Jacques Bonhomme," *Le Censeur européen*, May 1820, reprinted in *Dix ans d'études historiques*.
17. A. Thierry, *Essai sur l'histoire... du Tiers-Etat*, p. 10. The inaccurate quotation has been checked against the original and emended.

eleven

17 MARCH 1976

From the power of sovereignty to power over life. - Make live and let die. - From man as body to man as species: the birth of biopower. - Biopower's fields of application. - Population. - Of death, and of the death of Franco in particular. - Articulations of discipline and regulation: workers' housing, sexuality, and the norm. - Biopower and racism. - Racism: functions and domains. - Nazism. - Socialism.

IT IS TIME TO end then, to try to pull together what I have been saying this year. I have been trying to raise the problem of war, seen as a grid for understanding historical processes. It seemed to me that war was regarded, initially and throughout practically the whole of the eighteenth century, as a war between races. It was that war between races that I wanted to try to reconstruct. And last time, I tried to show you how the very notion of war was eventually eliminated from historical analysis by the principle of national universality.* I would now like to show you how, while the theme of race does not disappear, it does become part of something very different, namely State racism. So today I would like to tell you a little about State racism, or at least situate it for you.

It seems to me that one of the basic phenomena of the nineteenth century was what might be called power's hold over life. What I mean is the acquisition of power over man insofar as man is a living being,

*In the manuscript, the sentence continues: "at the time of the Revolution."