the Critical Theory position has a distinct advantage over that of the post-structuralists; for while figures such as Lyotard force themselves into a corner, where they can only denounce the dominance of the ego as an arbitrary coercion which should be abolished (whether it could is somewhat more problematic), Adorno perceives that compulsive identity, the sacrifice of the moment for the future, was necessary at a certain stage of history, in order for human beings to liberate themselves from blind subjugation to nature. To this extent such identity already contains a moment of freedom. Accordingly, the 'spell of selfhood' cannot be seen simply as an extension of natural coercion; rather, it is an illusion which could, in principle, be reflectively broken through by the subject which it generates -- although the full realization of this process would be inseparable from a transformation of social relations. Furthermore, the result of such a breakthrough would not be the self-defeating inrush of the 'fluid and lethal powers' which Lyotard describes, but rather a true identity -- one which would be permeable to its own non-identical moment. One of the major differences between post-structuralism and Critical Theory is summarized in Adorno's contention that 'even when we merely limit the subject, we put an end to its power'. ⁴⁵

This brings us to a second point. Lyotard describes the mirroranimals as 'monsters', but Borges specifies that the people of Canton believe the creature of the mirror to be a fish, 'a shifting and shining creature that nobody has ever caught'; while in Yunnan it is believed to be a tiger. In Adorno's thought it is under this double aspect that the non-identical appears to identity-thinking: on the one hand as something of tantalizing beauty which perpetually eludes our grasp, on the other as something menacing and uncontrollable, menacing precisely because of our inordinate need to control it. Yet we cannot enter into relation with this creature, either by smashing the mirror (the solution of the 'philosophers of desire'), or by claiming -- as does Derrida -- that both the human world and the reflected world are merely effects generated by its invisible surface. Rather, the only way to achieve this relation is to revoke the spell cast by the Emperor on the animals -which is also, as we have seen, a spell cast on himself.

It would not do to conclude, however, without stressing an important distinction between the lesson of Borges's tale and the philosophical position of Adorno. The story does contain an evocation of utopia, but Borges sets this in a distant, irrecoverable past. 'In legendary times', he tells us, 'the world of mirrors and the world of men were not . . . cut off from each other. They were, besides, quite different; neither beings nor colours nor shapes were the same. Both kingdoms, the specular and the human, lived in harmony; you could come and go

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