adopts a Hegelian or essentialist position, which often seems to be implicit in Mannheim's work. None the less, the role of the economy in Therborn's theory of ideology could be rather clearer.

This lack of clarity does have some specific consequences. In the first place, it is not always clear why particular classes should have particular ideologies, although there is a sketch of the kinds of ideology that Therborn believes to be appropriate to specific classes (Chapter 3). Secondly, we are not told why the ideological system is 'overdetermined by class forces' -- an important point if one wishes to establish the primacy of class (although, it should be said, Therborn does suggest that he does not have the space to develop the point). Thirdly, the relationship between class and power is obscured. The tide of Therborn's essay implies that power is his primary focus, and this attitude emerges at various points. For example, he starts by saying: 'The main concern of this essay is the operation of ideology in the organization, maintenance and transformation of power in society' (p. 1 ). That is by no means a peculiarly Marxist aim, and it is central, for example, to its main competitor, Weberian sociology. Power, class, and economy are analytically distinct and, as our analysis of Mannheim showed, one can have an interest in power, even in class power, without any commitment to a Marxist social theory. Marxists claim to be able to answer all three of these points by reference to an analysis of the economy.

Without a more detailed specification of the relationship between ideology and economy it is difficult to know how Therborn resolves the dilemmas. The tension here is further illustrated by a consideration of the second dilemma noted above, that of the definition of the concept of ideology itself:

'Ideology' will be used here in a very broad sense. It will not necessarily imply any particular content (falseness, miscognition, imaginary as opposed to real character), nor will it assume any necessary degree of elaboration and coherence. Rather it will refer to that aspect of the human condition under which human beings live their lives as conscious actors in a world that makes sense to them to varying degrees. Ideology is the medium through which this consciousness and meaningfulness operate. (p. 2 )

Therborn clearly regards ideology as constituting human subjectivity, and he quite deliberately breaks with the conception of ideology as deficient: 'The broad definition of ideology adopted here departs from the usual Marxist one, by not restricting it to forms of illusion and miscognition' (p. 5 ). He is, of course, correct to identify ideology-ascritique as a central plank of Marxist theory. Indeed, unless it were the

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